Approach for message level encryption for service APIs

ABSTRACT

Disclosed are requesting party and responding party computer systems which perform a message level encryption for messages sent through the computer systems. Using the message level encryption, the computer systems may prevent those with access to an unsecured zone in one or more of the computer systems from viewing the messages.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation application of and claims priority toU.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/355,872 filed on Nov. 18, 2016,which is a continuation application of and claims priority to U.S.patent application Ser. No. 14/596,267 filed on Jan. 14, 2015, now U.S.Pat. No. 9,531,688, which claims priority to U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 61/927,734, filed on Jan. 15, 2014, entitled “DesignApproach for Message Level Encryption for Service APIs,” which is herebyincorporated by reference for all purposes.

FIELD

The present invention generally relates to the exchange of informationusing encryption.

BACKGROUND

Many of the older financial institutions follow an “onion securitymodel” which has many layers of security between the application serversand the network edge. The “onion security model” requires that, at eachlayer of security, a message be decrypted, analyzed, and re-encryptedbefore passing a message on to the next layer. Most financialinstitutions have not yet moved to secure, lights out data centers.Instead, operations personnel at financial institutions are allowed bothphysical and login access to a financial institution's servers.Therefore, the operations personnel can see unencrypted messages whilethe messages are analyzed at each layer of security.

SUMMARY

Disclosed herein is a method for message level encryption executed byone or more dedicated processors of a computer system of a requestingparty for encrypted transmission of messages through an unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the requesting party, through an unsecurezone within a computer system of a responding party, or through both.The method may comprise encrypting, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a request message with a request message-level encryption;encrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, the request messagewith a request second level encryption; sending, by the one or morededicated processors, the request message to a responding party via theunsecure zone within the computer system of the requesting party, viathe unsecure zone within the computer system of the responding party, orvia both; generating, by the one or more dedicated processors, a requestsession key uniquely created for the request message; encrypting, by theone or more dedicated processors, the request session key to produce anencrypted request session key; receiving, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a response message having a response message levelencryption and a response second level encryption from the respondingparty via passage of the response message through the unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the requesting party, via passage of theresponse message through the unsecure zone within the computer system ofthe responding party, or via both; decrypting, by the one or morededicated processors, the response second level encryption; decrypting,by the one or more dedicated processors, the response message levelencryption using a requester private key, a response session key, orboth; decrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, the responsemessage level encryption using the request session key; storing, by theone or more dedicated processors, a requester public key, the requesterprivate key, and a responder public key in an HSM system of therequesting party; or combinations thereof.

Also disclosed herein is a method for message level encryption executedby or more dedicated processors of a computer system of a respondingparty for encrypted transmission of messages through an unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the requesting party, through an unsecurezone within a computer system of a responding party, or through both,the method comprising encrypting, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a response message with a response message-level encryption;encrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, the responsemessage with a response second level encryption; sending, by the one ormore dedicated processors, the response message to the requesting partyvia the unsecure zone within the computer system of the requestingparty, via the unsecure zone within the computer system of theresponding party, or via both; receiving, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a request session key from the requesting party; generating,by the one or more dedicated processors, a response session key uniquelycreated for the response message; encrypting, by the one or morededicated processors, the response session key to produce an encryptedresponse session key; receiving, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a request message having a request message level encryptionand a request second level encryption from the requesting party viapassage of the request message through the unsecure zone within thecomputer system of the requesting party, via passage of the responsemessage through the unsecure zone within the computer system of theresponding party, or via both; decrypting, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, the request second level encryption; decrypting, by the oneor more dedicated processors, the request message level encryption usinga responder private key, the request session key, or both; storing, bythe one or more dedicated processors, a responder public key, theresponder private key, and a requester public key in an HSM system ofthe responding party; or combinations thereof.

Also disclosed herein is a request server comprising one or morededicated processors which perform message level encryption in acomputer system of a requesting party, for encrypted transmission ofmessages through an unsecure zone within the computer system of therequesting party, through an unsecure zone within a computer system of aresponding party, or through both. The one or more dedicated processorsmay cause the request server to encrypt a request message with a requestmessage-level encryption; encrypt the request message with a requestsecond level encryption; send the request message to a responding partyvia the unsecure zone within the computer system of the requestingparty, via the unsecure zone within the computer system of theresponding party, or via both; generate a request session key uniquelycreated for the request message; encrypting the request session key toproduce an encrypted request session key; receive a response messagehaving a response message level encryption and a response second levelencryption from the responding party via passage of the response messagethrough the unsecure zone within the computer system of the requestingparty, via passage of the response message through the unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the responding party, or via both; decryptthe response second level encryption; decrypt the response message levelencryption using a requester private key, a response session key, orboth; decrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, the responsemessage level encryption using the request session key; store arequester public key, the requester private key, and a responder publickey in an HSM system of the requesting party; or combinations thereof.

Also disclosed herein is a response server comprising one or morededicated processors which perform message level encryption in acomputer system of a responding party, for encrypted transmission ofmessages through an unsecure zone within the computer system of theresponding party, through an unsecure zone within a computer system of arequesting party, or through both. The one or more dedicated processorsmay cause the request server to encrypt a response message with aresponse message-level encryption; encrypt the response message with aresponse second level encryption; send the response message to therequesting party via the unsecure zone within the computer system of therequesting party, via the unsecure zone within the computer system ofthe responding party, or via both; receive a request session key fromthe requesting party; generate a response session key uniquely createdfor the response message; encrypt the response session key to produce anencrypted response session key; receive a request message having arequest message level encryption and a request second level encryptionfrom the requesting party via passage of the request message through theunsecure zone within the computer system of the requesting party, viapassage of the response message through the unsecure zone within thecomputer system of the responding party, or via both; decrypt therequest second level encryption; decrypt the request message levelencryption using a responder private key, the request session key, orboth; store a responder public key, the responder private key, and arequester public key in an HSM system of the responding party; orcombinations thereof.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a better understanding of the nature of the features of theinvention, reference should be made to the following detaileddescription taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, inwhich:

FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of a request message.

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a response message.

FIG. 3 illustrates another embodiment of a response message.

FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a request computer system whichcommunicates with a response computer system via an unsecure zoneinternal to the request computer system, utilizing the message levelencryption disclosed herein.

FIG. 5 schematically illustrates a request computer system whichcommunicates with a response computer system via an unsecure zoneinternal to the response computer system, utilizing the message levelencryption disclosed herein.

FIG. 6 schematically illustrates a request computer system whichcommunicates with a response computer system via at least one unsecurezone among multiple servers and security proxies of the request computersystem, utilizing the message level encryption disclosed herein.

FIG. 7 schematically illustrates a request computer system whichcommunicates with a response computer system via at least one unsecurezone among multiple servers and security proxies of the responsecomputer system, utilizing the message level encryption disclosedherein.

FIG. 8 schematically illustrates a request computer system whichcommunicates with a response computer system via at least one unsecurezone among multiple servers and security proxies of the request computersystem and via at least one unsecure zone among multiple servers andsecurity proxies of the response computer system, utilizing the messagelevel encryption disclosed herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Disclosed herein are methods, servers, and computer systems forproviding secure transmission of request and response messages between arequesting party and a responding party, where the messages areencrypted at the message level for passage through areas or points in acomputer system of the requesting party and/or the responding partywhich are not secure, for example, over unsecure network connections orwithin an unsecure server itself.

The request computer system generally comprises computer devicesincluding at least one server, at least one security proxy, a hardwaresecurity module, and communications networking connecting the server,security proxy, and hardware security module such that information mayflow among the computer devices in the request computer system.Likewise, the response computer system generally comprises computerdevices including at least one server, a security gateway, optionally asecurity proxy, at least one database, a hardware security module, andcommunications hardware connecting the server, security gateway,optional security proxy, and hardware security module such thatinformation may flow among the computer devices in the response computersystem. According to embodiments of the disclosure, at least one of therequest computer system and response computer system has at least oneunsecure zone, e.g., an internal part of the computer system whereinformation is viewable by those with access to the computer system. Forexample, a financial institution (e.g., a bank) may have personnel withaccess (e.g., login credentials) to a server and/or communicationnetworking in the financial institution's computer system. Withoutencryption of the information passing internally of the financialinstitution's computer system according to this disclosure, personnelwith access to the financial institution's computer system can view theinformation.

The term “encrypt” means to transform from an intelligible form to anunintelligible form.

The term “encryption” means a process of transforming from intelligibleform to an unintelligible form.

The term “decrypt” means to transform from an unintelligible form to anintelligible form.

The term “decryption” means a process of transforming from anunintelligible form to an intelligible form.

The term “requesting party” includes any individual or entity having arelationship with a responding party for sending a request to theresponding party.

The term “responding party” includes any individual or entity that has arelationship with the requesting party and that responds to the requestreceived from the requesting party.

The term “server” includes one or more physical computer devices whichinclude one or more processors and instructions which cause the serverto perform the functions specified herein. It is intended that “server”may refer to a single server performing the functions disclosed hereinor multiple servers collectively performing the functions disclosedherein.

The term “processor” refers to a physical component of a server whichcan be coupled with a physical non-transitory computer readable memoryof the server which stores programming instructions. It is intended that“processor” may refer to a single processor which executes theinstructions or multiple processors which collectively execute theinstructions.

The term “dedicated processor” refers to a physical component of aserver which can be coupled with a physical non-transitory computerreadable memory of the server which stores programming instructions,wherein the dedicated processor performs specific and/or particularfunctions pursuant to specific programming instructions. It is intendedthat dedicated processor may refer to a single processor which executesthe specific programming instructions or multiple processors whichcollectively execute the specific programming instructions. In anembodiment, the dedicated processor only performs the specificprogramming instructions' specific and/or particular functions. Inanother embodiment, the dedicated processor performs the specificprogramming instructions' specific and/or particular functions as wellas other functions.

The term “communication networking” includes wired and wirelessconnectivity for the transmission of information such as the keys andmessages disclosed herein. Nonlimiting examples of communicationnetworking include Ethernet, optical cables, coaxial cables, telephonelines, Wi-Fi communication hardware, Bluetooth communication hardware,satellite transmitter, mobile phone and data networks, and the like.

The term “unsecure zone” as used herein refers to a part of a computersystem which those with access thereto can view, determine of otherwiseobtain the information (e.g., credit card information, bank accountinformation, personal information, etc.) contained in messagestransmitted, processed, and/or analyzed in that part of the computersystem, absent message level encryption.

In embodiments, the computer system of each of the requesting party andresponding party may generate a public key and a private key pair foruse in the disclosed methods and systems. The request computer systemmay generate a requester public key and a requester private key, andsimilarly, the response computer system may generate a responder publickey and a responder private key. In alternative embodiments, the publicand private key of the requesting party may be generated outside thecomputer system of the requesting party disclosed herein. In alternativeembodiments, the public and private key of the responding party may begenerated outside the computer system of the responding party disclosedherein.

The requesting party may store the requester public key and requesterprivate key in a hardware security module of the requesting party(hereinafter “request HSM”) for subsequent use as disclosed herein.Likewise, the responding party may store the responder public key andresponder private key in a hardware security module of the respondingparty (hereinafter “response HSM”) for subsequent use as disclosedherein.

A relationship may be created between a requesting party and aresponding party when the requesting party provides the requester publickey to the responding party, and the responding party provides theresponder public key to the requesting party. Additionally oralternatively, a relationship may be created between a requesting partyand a responding party when the requesting party receives the responderpublic key from the responding party, and the responding party receivesthe requester public key from the requesting party.

The requesting party may store the responder public key in the requestHSM for subsequent use as disclosed herein. Likewise, the respondingparty may store the requester public key in the response HSM forsubsequent use as disclosed herein. Once the relationship between arequesting party and a responding party is established, message levelencrypted request messages may be sent from request computer system ofthe requesting party to the response computer system of the respondingparty, and message level encrypted response messages may be sent fromresponse computer system of the responding party to the request computersystem of the requesting party.

The request computer system may generate a requester private key andstore the requester private key on the request HSM for retrieval when arequest message is to be sent to the responding party. The responsecomputer system may generate a responder private key and store theresponder private key on the response HSM for retrieval when a responsemessage is to be sent to the requesting party.

In order to send a request message to a responding party, the requestcomputer system may generate a request session key which is aone-time-use session key unique to the request message. In order to senda response message, the response computer system may, in someembodiments, generate a response session key which is a one-time-usesession key unique to the response message, or in other embodiments, usethe received request session key for the response message. Inembodiments, the request session key is not stored on either of theresponse HSM or the request HSM. In embodiments which utilize a responsesession key, the response session key is not stored on either of theresponse HSM or the request HSM.

A brief explanation regarding the public keys, private keys, and sessionkeys used in the message level encryption disclosed herein are shown inTable 1 below. The keys are also discussed in more detail herein.

TABLE 1 Requester shared with a responding party before transmission ofa Public Key request message, e.g., via email or secure file transferused by a responding party to encrypt a response session key used by aresponding party to verify a signature of an encrypted request sessionkey Requester used by a requesting party to decrypt an encryptedresponse Private Key session key used by a requesting party to generatea signature for an encrypted request session key Request used by arequesting party to encrypt a body of a request Session Key messagepassed to a responding party as an encrypted header value of a requestmessage used by a responding party to decrypt an encrypted body of arequest message Responder shared with a requesting party beforetransmission of a Public Key request message, e.g., via email or securefile transfer used by a requesting party to encrypt a request sessionkey used by a requesting party to verify a signature of an encryptedresponse session key Responder used by a responding party to decrypt anencrypted request Private Key session key used by a responding party togenerate a signature for an encrypted response session key Response usedby a responding party to encrypt a body of a response Session Keymessage passed to a requesting party as an encrypted header value of aresponse message used by a requesting party to decrypt an encrypted bodyof a response message

FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of a request message 10. As can beseen, a request message 10 may comprise a request header 20 and anencrypted request body 31. The request header 20 may comprise a requestsession key 22 and a request signature 24. The request session key 22may be encrypted using the responder public key to produce the encryptedrequest session key 21. The requester private key is used to generatethe signature 24 for the encrypted request session key 21, the requesterprivate key may be used to generate signature 24 for the request sessionkey 22, or both. The request body 30 may be encrypted using the requestsession key 22 to produce an encrypted request body 31. The requestmessage 10 configured as described for FIG. 1 may be sent from therequesting party's request computer system to the responding party'sresponse computer system (described in more detail below).

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a response message 40. As can beseen, the response message 40 may comprise a response header 50 and anencrypted response body 61. The response header 50 may comprise aresponse session key 52 and a response signature 54. The responsesession key 52 may be encrypted using the requester public key toproduce the encrypted response session key 51. The responder private keymay be used to generate signature 54 for the encrypted response sessionkey 51, the responder private key may be used to generate signature 54for the response session key 52, or both. The response body 60 may beencrypted using the response session key 52 to produce an encryptedresponse body 61. The embodiment of the response message 40 configuredas described for FIG. 2 may be sent from the responding party's responsecomputer system to the requesting party's request computer system(described in more detail below).

FIG. 3 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a response message 70.As can be seen, the response message 70 may comprise an encryptedresponse body 91. The response body 90 may be encrypted using therequest session key 22 obtained from the request message 10 to produceencrypted response body 91. The embodiment of the response message 70configured as described for FIG. 3 may be sent from the respondingparty's response computer system to the requesting party's requestcomputer system (described in more detail below).

Nonlimiting HTTP header attribute examples the headers 20 and 50depicted in FIGS. 1 and 2 are shown in Table 2 below:

TABLE 2 Example HTTP Header Attributes Type Description Scope Acceptmatches the body format of Request Message response message requiredOnly by the requesting party Accept- matches the encoding of the RequestMessage Encoding body of the response message Only required by therequesting party Content- matches the body format of the Request andType request message Response Messages Content- matches the encoding ofthe Request and Encoding body of request message Response MessagesEncrypted- the encrypted session key Request and Key Response MessagesKey- the signature of the encrypted Request and Signature session keyResponse Messages

The body format of the request message and response message can be anyformat known in the art with the aid of this disclosure, for example,“JSON” or “XML” format. The encryption and decryption of the body of therequest message and response message can be made using any symmetricencryption algorithm known in the art with the aid of this disclosure,for example, the “AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding” algorithm. The encryption anddecryption of the session key and the generation and validation of thesignature of the encrypted session key can be made using any asymmetricencryption algorithm known in the art with the aid of this disclosure,for example, “SHA1withRSA” for the signature, and“RSA/NONE/OAEPWithSHA256AndMGF1Padding” for encryption. The encodingformat for the encrypted session key and signature can be any formatknown in the art with the aid of this disclosure, for example,“org.apache.commons.codec.binary.Base64” for byte encoding. Inembodiments, the same algorithm is used to encode and decode aparameter, e.g., the requesting party and responding party use the samealgorithm to encode and decode the request body of the request message.In embodiments, the format of the request message and the format of theresponse message can be the same. Alternatively, the format of therequest message and the format of the response message can be different.

In embodiments, the algorithm(s) which are used to encode the requestmessage can be the same as the algorithm(s) which are used to decode therequest message; the algorithm(s) which are used to encode the requestmessage can be not the same as (different from) the algorithm(s) whichare used to decode the request message; the algorithm(s) which are usedto encode the response message can be the same as the algorithm(s) whichare used to decode the response message; the algorithm(s) which are usedto encode the response message can be not the same as (different from)the algorithm(s) which are used to decode the response message; thealgorithm(s) which are used to encode the request message can be thesame as the algorithm(s) which are used to encode the response message;the algorithm(s) which are used to encode the request message can be notthe same as (different from) the algorithm(s) which are used to encodethe response message; the algorithm(s) which are used to encode therequest message can be the same as the algorithm(s) which are used todecode the response message; the algorithm(s) which are used to encodethe request message can be not the same as (different from) thealgorithm(s) which are used to decode the response message; thealgorithm(s) which are used to decode the request message can be thesame as the algorithm(s) which are used to encode the response message;the algorithm(s) which are used to decode the request message can be notthe same as (different from) the algorithm(s) which are used to encodethe response message; the algorithm(s) which are used to decode therequest message can be the same as the algorithm(s) which are used todecode the response message; the algorithm(s) which are used to decodethe request message can be not the same as (different from) thealgorithm(s) which are used to decode the response message; orcombinations thereof.

FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a request computer system 100 whichcommunicates with a response computer system 300 via an unsecure zone107 internal to the request computer system 100, utilizing message levelencryption. The message level encryption is generally executed on therequest server 102 of the request computer system 100 and the responsesever 302 of the response computer system 300 so as to transmit amessage-level encrypted request message (e.g., request message 10) andreceive a message-level encrypted response message (e.g., responsemessage 40 or 70) via an unsecure zone 107 within the request computersystem 100.

In embodiments, the request server 102 may receive the responder publickey and generating a requester public key and a requester private key(e.g., receipt of a responder public key and generation of a requesterpublic/private key pair may be accomplished via a technique known in theart). In embodiments, the request server 102 may receive instruction ordecide (e.g., upon the occurrence of one or more conditions) to generatea request. The request server 102, having previously stored theresponder public key and requester private key on the request HSM 101,may retrieve the stored keys from request HSM 101 via communicationnetworking 115 between the request server 102 and the request HSM 101.The request server 102 may generate a request session key 22 and createthe request message 10 having the message level encryption described inFIG. 1, where the request session key 22 is uniquely created for therequest message 10. Moreover, the request session key 22 is a one-timeuse session key in that the request session key 22 is not used foranother request message (although the request session key 22 may be usedfor a response message 70 as described in more detail herein).

The request server 102 may send the request message 10 to the responseserver 302 via an unsecure zone 107 within the request computer system100. In FIG. 4, the unsecure zone 107 may be the communicationnetworking 108, the request security proxy 105, or both. Those withaccess to the communication networking 108, the request security proxy105, or both, cannot view or determine the contents of the requestmessage 10 because the request server 102, before transmitting therequest message 10 via communication networking 108 and request securityproxy 105, may encrypt the body 30 of the request message 10 with themessage level encryption described in FIG. 1, e.g., the request sessionkey 22 is encrypted using the responder public key to produce encryptedrequest session key 21, the requester private key is used to generatethe signature 24 for the encrypted request session key 21, and therequest body 30 is encrypted using the request session key 22 to produceencrypted request body 31. The request message 10 is transmitted viacommunication networking 108 to the request security proxy 105 where therequest message 105 is analyzed (e.g., message auditing). In the requestsecurity proxy 105, the request message 10 remains with the messagelevel encryption as described in FIG. 1 such that those with access tothe request security proxy 105 cannot view or determine the informationcontained in the request message 10. That is, the request security proxy105 of the request computer system 100 does not have both the responderprivate key and request session key which are needed to decrypt themessage level encryption applied to the request message 10 (e.g., theresponder private key which is needed to decrypt the encrypted requestsession key 21 or the request session key 22 needed to decrypt theencrypted request body 31 of the request message 10). The “message levelencryption” disclosed herein is also referred to as “first levelencryption.”

The request security proxy 105 may refer to an application run on aserver (e.g., the request server 102 or another server in the requestcomputer system 100), or the request security proxy 105 may itself beone or more servers of the request computer system 100 in addition tothe request server 102. The request security proxy 105 may use a clientcertificate issued by the responding party to authenticate the requestcomputer system 100 to the response computer system 300 and to establisha second level encryption in addition to the first level encryption(e.g., message level encryption as described herein) of the requestmessage 10, e.g., the second level encryption being TLS encryptionwithin HTTPS, for transmission of the request message 10 to the responsecomputer system 300.

The second level encryption may be different than the first levelencryption (e.g., message level encryption described herein) at leastbecause the first level encryption uses the public keys, private keys,and session keys for the message level encryption described herein,while the second level encryption uses the client and servercertificates for bi-directional authentication and establishing atransmission level encryption (e.g., TLS encryption within HTTPS) fortransmitting the request message 10 to the response computer system 300.The terms “transmission level encryption” and “second level encryption”are interchangeable. After establishing the second level encryption fortransmission of the request message 10, the request computer system 100sends the request message 10 to the response computer system 300 viacommunication pathway 200 (e.g., HTTPS). In embodiments, thecommunication pathway 200 is a two-way communication pathway.

After sending the request message 10, the request server 102 may destroyany copy of the request session key 22 on the request server 102;alternatively, the request server 102 may retain the request session key22 within the request computer system 100 to decrypt a response message(e.g., response message 70).

The response computer system 300 may receive the request message 10having the first level encryption (message level encryption) and secondlevel encryption (transmission level encryption) via the communicationpathway 200. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, the response computersystem 300 has no unsecure zone (e.g., is a cloud based system), unlikethe request computer system 100.

In embodiments, the response computer system 300 may have a securitygateway 305 which establishes the second level encryption with therequest computer system 100 using a server certificate of the respondingparty to authenticate the response computer system 300 to the requestcomputer system 100 for establishing the second level encryption fortransmission of the request message 10. In an embodiment, the securitygateway 305 is an application contained on the response server 302;alternatively, the security gateway 305 is another server in theresponse computer system 300 connected to the response server 302 viacommunication networking 308. After decrypting the second levelencryption, the security gateway 305 establishes an internal secondlevel encryption for transmission of the request message 10 still havingthe first level encryption (e.g., the message level encryption)internally of the response computer system 300 from the security gateway305 to the response server 302. The internal second level encryption maybe established using an internal client certificate and/or internalserver certificate of the responding party to provide the internalsecond level encryption in addition to the first level encryption (e.g.,message level encryption as described herein) of the request message 10,e.g., TLS encryption within HTTPS. The security gateway 305 may send therequest message 10 having first level encryption and internal secondlevel encryption to the response server 302 via communication networking308 (e.g., via TLS encryption within HTTPS).

The internal second level encryption may be different than the firstlevel encryption (e.g., message level encryption described herein) atleast because the first level encryption uses the public keys, privatekeys, and session keys for the first level encryption described herein,while the internal second level encryption uses an internal clientcertificate and/or certified server certificate for authentication andestablishing an internal transmission level encryption (e.g., TLSencryption within HTTPS) for transmitting the request message 10 to theresponse server 302 via communication networking 308 within the responsecomputer system 300. Additionally, the internal second level encryptionis different than the second level encryption used for transmitting therequest message 10 via communication pathway 200 at least because theinternal second level encryption is for communication between componentsonly of the responding party's response computer system 300; whereas,the second level encryption (transmission level encryption) is forsecure communication between the requesting party's request computersystem 100 and the responding party's response computer system 300.

The response server 302 may receive the request message 10 having firstlevel encryption and second level encryption (e.g., the internal secondlevel encryption for embodiments of the response computer system 300having a security gateway 305, or the second level encryption forembodiments in which the request computer system 100 sends the requestmessage 10 to the response server 302 without first passing through thesecurity gateway 305). The response server 302 may decrypt the secondlevel encryption (e.g., the internal second level encryption or thetransmission level encryption, depending on the configuration of theresponse computer system 300).

The response server 302 may then analyze the first level encryption ofthe request message 10. The response server 302 may determine therequest message 10 is a request message which contains a signature 24(e.g., which was generated using the requester private key). Theresponse server 302 may determine that the signature 24 can be verifiedusing the requester public key by the responding party (e.g., therequester public key having been: i) previously received by the responseserver 302, ii) stored on the response HSM 301, or iii) both receivedand stored). The response server 302 may search for and/or retrieve therequester public key and the responder private key from the response HSM301 via communication networking 315.

In embodiments, the response server 302 may use the signature 24 of therequest message 10 to verify the encrypted request session key 21 hasnot been altered during transmission. In other embodiments, to verifythe encrypted request session key 21, the response server 302 may usethe requester public key in addition to the signature 24. Inembodiments, using the requester public key also verifies that therequesting party is the party who encrypted the request session key 22.In additional or alternative embodiments, using the requester public keyalso verifies that the request message 10 is actually from the requestserver 102.

After verification of the encrypted request session key 21, the responseserver 302 may decrypt the encrypted request session key 21 of therequest message 10 using the responder private key which matches and/orpairs with the responder public key which was used to encrypt therequest session key 22. After decryption of the encrypted requestsession key 21, the response server 302 may decrypt the encryptedrequest body 31 of the request message 10 using the request session key22.

The response server 302 may then interpret the body 30 of the requestmessage 10 and generate a response. Alternatively, the response server302 may communicate with another server of the response computer system300, e.g., communicate the request to another server which generates aresponse and which sends the response back to the response server 302for message level encryption.

The response server 302 performs message level encryption of theresponse so as to generate a response message (e.g., response message 40of FIG. 2 or response message 70 of FIG. 3) having first levelencryption (message level encryption) for transmission of the responsemessage 40 or 70 to the request computer system 100 and for passage ofthe response message 40 or 70 through the unsecure zone 107 of therequest computer system 100.

In an embodiment, the response server 302 may generate a responsesession key 52 and create the response message 40 as with the messagelevel encryption described for FIG. 2, where the response session key 52is uniquely created for the response message 40. Moreover, the responsesession key 52 is a one-time use session key in that the responsesession key 52 is not used for another response message. The responseserver 302, having previously stored the requester public key andresponder private key on the response HSM 301, may retrieve the storedkeys from response HSM 301 via communication networking 315 between theresponse server 302 and the request HSM 301. For response message 40,the response session key 52 may be encrypted using the requester publickey to produce the encrypted response session key 51, the responderprivate key may be used to generate the signature 54 for the encryptedresponse session key 51 (or for the response session key 52), and theresponse body 60 may be encrypted using the response session key 52 toproduce encrypted response body 61. The response server 302 may send theresponse message 40 to the request server 102 via communicationnetworking 308, response security gateway 305, communication pathway200, or combinations thereof, and via the request security proxy 105 andthe unsecure zone 107 described above which resides within the requestcomputer system 100.

In another embodiment, the response server 302 may use the requestsession key 22 received from the request server 102 for message levelencryption of the response message 70 described for FIG. 3. The responseserver 302 may encrypt the response body 90 using the request sessionkey 22 obtained from the request message 10 to produce encryptedresponse body 91. Because the request server 102 already has the requestsession key 22, the request session key 22 may not be included in theresponse message 70. As such, response message 70 may have a differentembodiment of first level encryption than the first level encryptiondescribed for response message 40 and request message 10. The responseserver 302 may send the response message 70 to the request server 102via an unsecure zone 107 described above which resides within therequest computer system 100. The response server 302 may send theresponse message 70 to the request server 102 via communicationnetworking 308, response security gateway 305, communication pathway200, or combinations thereof, and via the request security proxy 105 andthe unsecure zone 107 described above which resides within the requestcomputer system 100.

To send the response message 40 or 70, the response server 302 orresponse security gateway 305 may authenticate the response computersystem 300 using the server certificate and may establish the secondlevel encryption for transmission of the response message 40 or 70 fromthe response computer system 300 to the request computer system 100. Thesecond level encryption for transmission of the response message 40 or70 from the response computer system 300 to the request computer system100 may be the same as the second level encryption for transmission ofthe request message 10 from the request computer system 100 to theresponse computer system 300, e.g., TLS encryption within HTTPS viacommunication pathway 200.

After sending the response message 40 or 70, the response server 302 maydestroy any copy of the response session key 52 and request session key22 on the response server 302 or otherwise contained within the responsecomputer system 300.

Once the response message 40 or 70 is received, the security proxy 105decrypts the second level encryption and sends the response message 40or 70 still having first level encryption (message level encryption) tothe request server 102 via communication networking 108. The requestsecurity proxy 105 may also perform any message auditing on the response40 or 70 (e.g., check the message for a blacklisted IP address, a virussignature, a frequency of the response, or other message auditing).While passing through the request security proxy 105 and communicationnetworking 108, the response message 40 or 70 has the first levelencryption which prevents those with access to the unsecure zone 107(e.g., the request security proxy 105, the communication networking 108,or both) from viewing the information contained within the responsemessage 40 or 70.

The request server 102 may then analyze the first level encryption ofthe response message 40 or 70.

After analysis in embodiments having the response message 40, therequest server 102 may determine the response message 40 is a responsemessage which contains signature 54 (e.g., which was generated using theresponder private key). The request server 102 may determine that thesignature 54 can be verified using the responder public key previouslyreceived by the requesting party (e.g., the responder public key havingbeen stored on the request HSM 101).

The request server 102 may search for and/or retrieve the responderpublic key and the requester private key from the request HSM 101 viacommunication networking 115. The request server 102 may then validatethe signature 54 of the response message 40 using the responder publickey via one or more public/private key verification techniques known inthe art with the aid of this disclosure. For example, to validate thesignature 54, the request server 102 may use the responder public key toverify that the signature 54 of the response message 40 was generated bythe responding party using the responder private key.

After signature verification of the response message 40, the requestserver 102 may decrypt the encrypted response session key 51 of theresponse message 40 using the requester private key which matches and/orpairs with the requester public key which was used to encrypt theresponse session key 52. After decryption of the encrypted responsesession key 51, the request server 102 may decrypt the encryptedresponse body 61 of the response message 40 using the response sessionkey 52. The request server 102 may then interpret the body 60 of theresponse message 40.

After analysis in embodiments having the response message 70, becausethe requesting party already has the request session key 22, the requestserver 102 may decrypt the encrypted response body 91 of the responsemessage 70 using the request session key 22. Response message 70 has nosignature which needs to be verified by the request server 102. Therequest server 102 may then interpret the body 90 of the responsemessage 70.

FIG. 5 schematically illustrates a request computer system 120 whichcommunicates with a response computer system 320 via an unsecure zone307 internal to the response computer system 320, utilizing the messagelevel encryption disclosed herein. The request computer system 120 inFIG. 5 is the same as the request computer system 100 in FIG. 4, exceptrequest computer system 120 in FIG. 5 does not have an unsecure zone.Response computer system 320 in FIG. 5 is the same as the responsecomputer system 300 in FIG. 4, except response computer system 320 hasan unsecure zone 307. The message level encryption is generally executedon the request server 102 of the request computer system 120 and theresponse sever 302 of the response computer system 300 so as to enabletransmission of a message-level encrypted request message (e.g., requestmessage 10) over an unsecure zone 307 within the response computersystem 320.

In embodiments, the request server 102 may receive the responder publickey and generating a requester public key and a requester private keypair (e.g., receipt of a responder public key and generation of arequester public/private key pair may be accomplished via a techniqueknown in the art). In embodiments, the request server 102 may receiveinstruction or decide (e.g., upon the occurrence of one or moreconditions) to generate a request. In embodiments, the request server102, having previously stored the responder public key and requesterprivate key on the request HSM 101, may retrieve the stored keys fromrequest HSM 101 via communication networking 115 between the requestserver 102 and the request HSM 101. The request server 102 may generatea request session key 22 and create the request message 10 having themessage level encryption (e.g., first level encryption) described inFIG. 1, where the request session key 22 is uniquely created for therequest message 10. Moreover, the request session key 22 is a one-timeuse session key in that the request session key 22 is not used foranother request message.

The request server 102 may send the request message 10 to the requestsecurity proxy 105 via communication networking 108, neither of which ispart of an unsecure zone. To do so, the request server 102 may establishan internal second level encryption for transmission of the requestmessage 10 having the first level encryption (e.g., the message levelencryption) internally of the request computer system 120 from therequest server 102 to the request security proxy 105. The internalsecond level encryption may be established using an internal clientcertificate and/or certified server certificate of the requesting partyto provide the internal second level encryption in addition to the firstlevel encryption (e.g., message level encryption as described herein) ofthe request message 10, e.g., TLS encryption within HTTPS. The responseserver 102 may send the request message 10 having first level encryptionand internal second level encryption to the request security proxy 105via communication networking 108 (e.g., via TLS encryption withinHTTPS).

The internal second level encryption may be different than the firstlevel encryption (e.g., message level encryption described herein) atleast because the first level encryption uses the public keys, privatekeys, and session keys for the first level encryption described herein,while the internal second level encryption uses an internal clientcertificate and/or certified server certificate for authentication andestablishing an internal transmission level encryption (e.g., TLSencryption within HTTPS) for transmitting the request message 10 to therequest security proxy 105 via communication networking 108 within therequest computer system 120.

In embodiments, the request computer system 120 may have a requestsecurity proxy 105 which establishes a second level encryption with theresponse computer system 320 using a client certificate of therequesting party (issued by the responding party) to authenticate therequest computer system 120 to the response computer system 320 forestablishing the second level encryption in addition to the first levelencryption (e.g., the message level encryption of this disclosure) fortransmission of the request message 10, e.g., the second levelencryption being TLS encryption within HTTPS. In an embodiment, therequest security proxy 105 is an application contained on the requestserver 102; alternatively, request security proxy 105 is another serverin the request computer system 120 connected to the request server 102via communication networking 108.

As described for FIG. 4, the second level encryption used in FIG. 5 maybe different than the first level encryption (e.g., message levelencryption described herein) at least because the first level encryptionuses the public keys, private keys, and session keys for the messagelevel encryption described herein, while the second level encryptionuses the client and server certificates for bi-directionalauthentication and establishing a transmission level encryption (e.g.,TLS encryption within HTTPS) for transmitting the request message 10 tothe response computer system 320. Additionally, the second levelencryption used for transmitting the request message 10 viacommunication pathway 200 is different than the internal second levelencryption used by the request computer system 120 at least because theinternal second level encryption is for communication between componentsonly of the requesting party's request computer system 120; whereas, thesecond level encryption (transmission level encryption) is for securecommunication between the requesting party's request computer system 120and the responding party's response computer system 320. Afterestablishing the second level encryption for transmission of the requestmessage 10, the request computer system 120 sends the request message 10to the response computer system 320 via communication pathway 200 (e.g.,HTTPS).

After sending the request message 10, the request server 102 may destroyany copy of the request session key 22 on the request server 102;alternatively, the request server 102 may retain the request session key22 within the request computer system 120.

The response computer system 320 may receive the request message 10having the first level encryption (message level encryption) and secondlevel encryption (transmission level encryption) via the communicationpathway 200. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, the response computersystem 320 has an unsecure zone 307, unlike the request computer system120. The unsecure zone 307 of the response computer system 320 of FIG. 5includes the response security gateway 305, the communication networking308, or both.

The response security gateway 305 may receive the request message 10having first level encryption and second level encryption viacommunication pathway 200. The response security gateway 305 may referto an application run on a server (e.g., the response server 302 oranother server in the response computer system 320), or the responsesecurity gateway 305 may itself be one or more servers of the responsecomputer system 320 in addition to the response server 302.

Once the request message 10 is received, the response security gateway305 may decrypt the second level encryption and may send the requestmessage 10 still having first level encryption (message levelencryption) to the response server 302 via communication networking 308.In the response security gateway 305, the request message 10 remainswith the message level encryption as described in FIG. 1 such that thosewith access to the response security gateway 305 cannot view ordetermine the information contained in the request message 10. That is,the response security gateway 305 of the response computer system 320does not have both the responder private key and request session keywhich are needed to decrypt the message level encryption applied to therequest message 10 (e.g., the responder private key which is needed todecrypt the encrypted request session key 21 or the request session key22 needed to decrypt the encrypted request body 31 of the requestmessage 10). Thus, while passing through the response security gateway305 and communication networking 308, the request message 10 still hasthe first level encryption which prevents those with access to theunsecure zone 307 (e.g., the response security gateway 305, thecommunication networking 308, or both) from viewing the informationcontained within the request message 10.

The response server 302 may then analyze the first level encryption ofthe request message 10. The response server 302 may determine therequest message 10 is a request message which contains a signature 24(e.g., which was generated using the requester private key). Theresponse server 302 may determine that the signature 24 can be verifiedby the responding party (e.g., the requester public key having been: i)previously received by the response server 302, ii) stored on theresponse HSM 301, or iii) both received and stored). The response server302 may search for and/or retrieve the requester public key and theresponder private key from the response HSM 301 via communicationnetworking 315.

In embodiments, the response server 302 may use the signature 24 of therequest message 10 to verify the encrypted request session key 21 hasnot been altered during transmission. In other embodiments, to verifythe encrypted request session key 21, the response server 302 may usethe requester public key in addition to the signature 24. Inembodiments, using the requester public key also verifies that therequesting party is the party who encrypted the request session key 22.In additional or alternative embodiments, using the requester public keyalso verifies that the request message 10 is actually from the requestserver 102.

After verification of the encrypted request session key 21, the responseserver 302 may decrypt the encrypted request session key 21 of therequest message 10 using the responder private key which matches and/orpairs with the responder public key which was used to encrypt therequest session key 22. After decryption of the encrypted requestsession key 21, the response server 302 may decrypt the encryptedrequest body 31 of the request message 10 using the request session key22.

The response server 302 may then interpret the body 30 of the requestmessage 10 and generate a response. Alternatively, the response server302 may communicate with another server of the response computer system300, e.g., communicate the request to another server which generates aresponse and which sends the response to the response server 302 formessage level encryption.

The response server 302 may perform message level encryption for theresponse so as to generate a response message (e.g., response message 40of FIG. 2 or response message 70 of FIG. 3) having first levelencryption (message level encryption) for transmission of the responsemessage 40 or 70 to the request computer system 100 and for passage ofthe response message 40 or 70 through the unsecure zone 307 of theresponse computer system 320.

In an embodiment, the response server 302 may generate a responsesession key 52 and create the response message 40 with the message levelencryption described for FIG. 2, where the response session key 52 isuniquely created for the response message 40. Moreover, the responsesession key 52 is a one-time use session key in that the responsesession key 52 is not used for another response message. The responseserver 302, having previously stored the requester public key andresponder private key on the response HSM 301, may retrieve the storedkeys from response HSM 301 via communication networking 315 between theresponse server 302 and the request HSM 301. For response message 40,the response session key 52 may be encrypted using the requester publickey to produce the encrypted response session key 51, the responderprivate key may be used to generate the signature 54 for the encryptedresponse session key 51, for the response session key 52, or both, andthe response body 60 may be encrypted using the response session key 52to produce encrypted response body 61. The response server 302 may sendthe response message 40 to the request server 102 via the unsecure zone307 described above which resides within the response computer system320, and via communication networking 108, request security proxy 105,communication pathway 200, or combinations thereof of the requestcomputer system 120.

In another embodiment, the response server 302 may use the requestsession key 22 received from the request server 102 for message levelencryption of the response message 70 as described for FIG. 3. Theresponse server 302 may encrypt the response body 90 using the requestsession key 22 obtained from the request message 10 to produce encryptedresponse body 91. Because the request server 102 already has the requestsession key 22, the request session key 22 may not be included in theresponse message 70. As such, response message 70 may have a differentembodiment of first level encryption than the first level encryptiondescribed for response message 40 and request message 10. The responseserver 302 may send the response message 70 to the request server 102via the unsecure zone 307 described above which resides within theresponse computer system 320, and via communication networking 108,request security proxy 105, communication pathway 200, or combinationsthereof of the request computer system 120.

Those with access to the communication networking 308, the responsesecurity gateway 305, or both, cannot view or determine the contents ofthe response message 40 or 70 because the response server 302, beforetransmitting the response message 40 or 70 via communication networking308 and response security proxy 305, configures the response message 40or 70 with the message level encryption described in FIGS. 2 and 3.

The response message 40 or 70 is transmitted via communicationnetworking 308 to the response security gateway 305 where the responsemessage 40 or 70 is analyzed having the first level encryption. To sendthe response message 40 or 70, the response security gateway 305 mayauthenticate the response computer system 320 using the servercertificate and may establish the second level encryption fortransmission of the response message 40 or 70 from the response computersystem 320 to the request computer system 120. The second levelencryption for transmission of the response message 40 or 70 from theresponse computer system 320 to the request computer system 120 may bethe same as the second level encryption for transmission of the requestmessage 10 from the request computer system 120 to the response computersystem 320, e.g., TLS encryption within HTTPS via communication pathway200.

After sending the response message 40 or 70, the response server 302 maydestroy any copy of the response session key 52 and request session key22 on the response server 302 or otherwise contained within the responsecomputer system 320.

Once the response message 40 or 70 is received, the request securityproxy 105 may decrypt the second level encryption and send the responsemessage 40 or 70 still having first level encryption (message levelencryption) to the request server 102 via communication networking 108via the internal second level encryption described above.

The request server 102 may then analyzes the first level encryption ofthe response message 40 or 70.

After analysis in embodiments having the response message 40, therequest server 102 may determine the response message 40 is a responsemessage which contains signature 54 (e.g., which was generated using theresponder private key). The request server 102 may determine thesignature 54 can be verified using the responder public key previouslyreceived by the requesting party (e.g., the responder public key havingbeen stored on the request HSM 101).

The request server 102 may search for and/or retrieve the responderpublic key and the requester private key from the request HSM 101 viacommunication networking 115. The request server 102 may then validatethe signature 54 of the response message 40 using the responder publickey via one or more public/private key verification techniques known inthe art with the aid of this disclosure. For example, to validate thesignature 54, the request server 102 may use the responder public key toverify that the signature 54 of the response message 40 was generated bythe responding party using the responder private key.

After signature verification of the response message 40, the requestserver 102 may decrypt the encrypted response session key 51 of theresponse message 40 using the requester private key which matches and/orpairs with the requester public key which was used to encrypt theresponse session key 52. After decryption of the encrypted requestsession key 51, the request server 102 may decrypt the encryptedresponse body 61 of the response message 40 using the request sessionkey 52. The request server 102 may then interpret the response body 60of the response message 40.

After analysis in embodiments having the response message 70, becausethe requesting party already has the request session key 22, the requestserver 102 may decrypt the encrypted response body 91 of the responsemessage 70 using the request session key 22. Response message 70 has nosignature which needs to be verified by the request server 102. Therequest server 102 may then interpret the response body 90 of theresponse message 70.

FIG. 6 schematically illustrates a request computer system 130 whichcommunicates with the response computer system 300 of FIG. 4 via atleast one unsecure zone 107 among multiple servers and security proxiesof the request computer system 130, utilizing the message levelencryption disclosed herein. FIG. 6 illustrates that the technique andconfigurations described for FIG. 4 can be utilized with a requestcomputer system 130 having multiple request servers 102, 103, and 104and multiple layers of security, e.g., request security proxy 105 andrequest security proxy 106; although, embodiments of this disclosureinclude request computer systems which have a single request server andmultiple layers of security and request computer system which havemultiple request servers and a single layer of security.

Any of the request server 102, request server 103, and request server104 may perform the message level encryption of a request message 10 andmessage level decryption of a response message 40 or 70 as described forrequest server 102 in the request computer system 100 of FIG. 4. Requestserver 102 communicates with response HSM 101 via communicationnetworking 114 and 117; request server 103 communicates with responseHSM 101 via communication networking 115 and 117; and request server 104communicates with response HSM 101 via communication networking 116 and117. Request and response messages are sent and received from requestserver 102 via communication networking 108, 109, and 111 and requestsecurity proxies 105 and 106; request and response messages are sent andreceived from request server 103 via communication networking 108, 109,and 113 and request security proxies 105 and 106; and request andresponse messages are sent and received from request server 104 viacommunication networking 108, 109, and 112 and request security proxies105 and 106.

When sending request message 10 from or receiving a response message 40or 70 at request server 102, the unsecure zone 107 of the requestcomputer system 130 in FIG. 6 may include one or more of communicationnetworking 108, 109, and 111 along with along with one or more ofrequest security proxies 105 and 106. When sending request message 10from or receiving a response message 40 or 70 at request server 103, theunsecure zone 107 of the request computer system 130 in FIG. 6 mayinclude one or more of communication networking 108, 109, and 113 alongwith along with one or more of request security proxies 105 and 106.When sending request message 10 from or receiving a response message 40or 70 at request server 104, the unsecure zone 107 of the requestcomputer system 130 in FIG. 6 may include one or more of communicationnetworking 108, 109, and 112 along with along with one or more ofrequest security proxies 105 and 106. For example, the requesting partymay have granted personnel access to all the communication networking108, 109, 111, 112, and 113 along with both request security proxies 105and 106, making all the communication networking 108, 109, 111, 112, and113 along with both request security proxies 105 and 106, the unsecurezone 107. Alternatively, the requesting party may have granted personnelaccess to less than all the communication networking 108, 109, 111, 112,and 113 and/or less than both request security proxies 105 and 106,making a combination of the communication networking 108, 109, 111, 112,and 113 and/or request security proxies 105 and 106, the unsecure zone107.

In request computer system embodiments having multiple layers ofsecurity such as request computer system 130 shown in FIG. 6 as havingrequest security proxy 105 and request security proxy 106, the outerlayer of security, e.g., request security proxy 105 performs the samefunctions as described for request security proxy 105 in requestcomputer system 100 of FIG. 4, except that the request security proxy105 receives the request message 10 from (and sends the response message40 or 70 to) the request security proxy 106 (an inner layer of security)instead of directly communicating with a request server.

The request security proxy 106 may receive the request message 10 havingfirst level encryption (message level encryption) and analyze therequest message 10 as does the request security proxy 105. In therequest security proxy 106, the request message 10 maintains the messagelevel encryption such that those with access to the request securityproxy 106 cannot view or determine the content of the request message 10even when the request security proxy 106 analyzes the request message10. After analyzing the request message 10, the request security proxy106 passes the request message 10 still having the first levelencryption (message level encryption) to the request security proxy 105.

The transmission of the request message from request security proxy 105to the response computer system 300 is the same as that described inFIG. 4 (e.g., establishment of a second level encryption). The responsecomputer system 300 performs the same message level decryption of therequest message 10 and message level encryption of a response message 40or 70 and sends the response message 40 or 70 to the request computersystem 130. Upon receipt of the response message 40 or 70 at the requestsecurity proxy 105, the request security proxy 105 analyzes the responsemessage 40 or 70 and, since the request security proxy 105 is the outerlayer of security, the request security proxy 105 passes the responsemessage 10 still having the first level encryption (message levelencryption) to the request security proxy 106 via communicationnetworking 108 for analysis at the request security proxy 106. Therequest security proxy 106 may receive the request message 10 havingfirst level encryption (message level encryption) and analyze therequest message 10. In the request security proxy 106, the requestmessage 10 maintains the message level encryption such that those withaccess to the request security proxy 106 cannot view or determine thecontent of the request message 10 even when the request security proxy106 analyzes the request message 10. After analyzing the request message10, the request security proxy 106 passes the request message 10 stillhaving the first level encryption (message level encryption) to therequest server (e.g., request server 102, 103, or 104) that originallysent the request message 10. In an alternative embodiment, the requestserver that sent the request message 10 does not have to be the samerequest server that receives the response message 40 or 70 correspondingto the request message 10.

FIG. 7 schematically illustrates a request computer system 120 of FIG. 5which communicates with the response computer system 330 via at leastone unsecure zone 307 among multiple servers and security proxies of theresponse computer system 330, utilizing the message level encryptiondisclosed herein. The request computer system 120 may perform the samefunctions as described in FIG. 5. FIG. 7 illustrates that the techniqueand configurations described for the response computer system 320 ofFIG. 5 can be utilized with a response computer system 330 havingmultiple response servers 302, 303, and 304 and multiple layers ofsecurity, e.g., response security gateway 305 and response securityproxy 306; although, embodiments of this disclosure include responsecomputer systems which have a single response server and multiple layersof security and request computer systems which have multiple responseservers and a single layer of security.

Any of the response server 302, response server 303, and response server304 may perform the message level decryption of a request message 10 andmessage level encryption of a response message 40 or 70 as described forresponse server 302 in the response computer system 320 of FIG. 5.Response server 302 communicates with response HSM 301 via communicationnetworking 314 and 317; response server 303 communicates with responseHSM 301 via communication networking 315 and 317; and response server304 communicates with response HSM 301 via communication networking 316and 317. Request and response messages are received and sent fromresponse server 302 via communication networking 308, 309, and 311 andresponse security gateway 305 and response security proxy 306; requestand response messages are received and sent from response server 303 viacommunication networking 308, 309, and 313 and response security gateway305 and response security proxy 306; and request and response messagesare received and sent from response server 304 via communicationnetworking 308, 309, and 312 and response security gateway 305 andresponse security proxy 306.

When receiving request message 10 at or sending a response message 40 or70 from response server 302, the unsecure zone 307 of the responsecomputer system 330 in FIG. 7 may include one or more of communicationnetworking 308, 309, and 311 along with one or more of response securitygateway 305 and response security proxy 306. When receiving requestmessage 10 at or sending a response message 40 or 70 from responseserver 303, the unsecure zone 307 of the response computer system 330 inFIG. 7 may include one or more of communication networking 308, 309, and313 along with along with one or more of response security gateway 305and response security proxy 306. When receiving request message 10 at orsending a response message 40 or 70 from response server 304, theunsecure zone 307 of the response computer system 330 in FIG. 7 mayinclude one or more of communication networking 308, 309, and 312 alongwith along with one or more of response security gateway 305 andresponse security proxy 306. For example, the responding party may havegranted personnel access to all the communication networking 308, 309,311, 312, and 313 along with both response security gateway 305 andresponse security proxy 306, making all the communication networking308, 309, 311, 312, and 313 along with both response security gateway305 and response security proxy 306, the unsecure zone 307.Alternatively, the responding party may have granted personnel access toless than all the communication networking 308, 309, 311, 312, and 313and/or less than both response security gateway 305 and responsesecurity proxy 306, making a combination of the communication networking308, 309, 311, 312, and 313 and/or response security gateway 305 andresponse security proxy 306, the unsecure zone 307.

In response computer system embodiments having multiple layers ofsecurity such as response computer system 330 shown in FIG. 7 as havingresponse security gateway 305 and response security proxy 306, the outerlayer of security, e.g., response security gateway 305 performs the samefunctions as described for response security gateway 305 in responsecomputer system 320 of FIG. 5, except that the response security gateway305 sends the request message 10 to (and receives the response message40 or 70 from) the response security proxy 306 (an inner layer ofsecurity) instead of directly communicating with a response server.

The response security proxy 306 may receive the request message 10having first level encryption (message level encryption) from theresponse security gateway 305 and analyze the request message 10. In theresponse security proxy 306, the request message 10 maintains themessage level encryption such that those with access to the responsesecurity proxy 306 cannot view or determine the content of the requestmessage 10 even when the response security proxy 306 analyzes therequest message 10 (e.g., checks the message for a blacklisted IPaddress, a virus signature, a frequency of the request, or other messageauditing). After analyzing the request message 10, the response securityproxy 306 passes the request message 10 still having the first levelencryption (message level encryption) to a response server 302, 303, or304.

The response server 302, 303, or 303 of the response computer system 330performs the same message level decryption of the request message 10 andmessage level encryption of a response message 40 or 70 as described forresponse server 302 in response computer system 320 in FIG. 5 and sendsthe response message 40 or 70 to the request computer system 120 via theresponse security gateway 305 and response security proxy 306 and theappropriate combination of communication networking (e.g., communicationnetworking 308, 309, and 311 for response server 302; communicationnetworking 308, 309, and 313 for response server 303; and communicationnetworking 308, 309, and 312 for response server 304).

Upon receipt of the response message 40 or 70 at the response securityproxy 306, the response security proxy 306 analyzes the response message40 or 70. In the response security proxy 306, the response message 40 or70 maintains the message level encryption such that those with access tothe response security proxy 306 cannot view or determine the content ofthe response message 40 or 70 even when the response security proxy 306analyzes the response message 40 or 70. After analyzing the responsemessage 40 or 70, the response security proxy 306 passes the responsemessage 40 or 70 still having the first level encryption (message levelencryption) to the response security gateway 305.

In the response security gateway 305, the response message 40 or 70maintains the message level encryption such that those with access tothe response security gateway 305 cannot view or determine the contentof the response message 40 or 70 even when the response security gateway305 analyzes the response message 40 or 70. After analyzing the responsemessage 40 or 70, the response security gateway 305 establishes thesecond level of encryption for transmission of the response message 40or 70 to the request computer system 120 in the same manner as describedfor FIG. 5. The request computer system 120 receives and decrypts themessage level encryption of the response message 40 or 70 in the samemanner as described for FIG. 5.

FIG. 8 schematically illustrates a request computer system 140 whichcommunicates with a response computer system 340 via at least oneunsecure zone 107 among multiple servers and security proxies of therequest computer system 140 and via at least one unsecure zone 307 amongmultiple servers and security proxies of the response computer system340, utilizing the message level encryption disclosed herein.

FIG. 8 illustrates that the technique and configurations described forFIGS. 4 and 6 can be utilized with a request computer system 140 havinga single request server 102 (although multiple request servers asillustrated in FIG. 6 are contemplated) and multiple layers of security,e.g., request security proxy 105 and request security proxy 106;although embodiments of this disclosure include request computer systemswhich have a single request server and multiple layers of security,request computer systems which have multiple request servers and asingle layer of security, request computer systems which have a singlerequest server and a single layer of security, and request computersystems which have multiple request servers and multiple layers ofsecurity.

The request server 102 may perform the message level encryption of arequest message 10 and message level decryption of a response message 40or 70 as described for request server 102 in the request computer system100 of FIG. 4. Request and response messages are sent and received fromrequest server 102 via communication networking 108 and 109.

When sending request message 10 from or receiving a response message 40or 70 at request server 102, the unsecure zone 107 of the requestcomputer system 140 in FIG. 8 may include one or more of communicationnetworking 108 and 109 along with along with one or more of requestsecurity proxies 105 and 106. The requesting party may have grantedpersonnel access to all the communication networking 108 and 109 alongwith both request security proxies 105 and 106, making all thecommunication networking 108 and 109 along with both request securityproxies 105 and 106, the unsecure zone 107. Alternatively, therequesting party may have granted personnel access to less than all thecommunication networking 108 and 109 and/or less than both requestsecurity proxies 105 and 106, making a combination of the communicationnetworking 108 and/or 109 and/or request security proxies 105 and/or106, the unsecure zone 107.

In request computer system embodiments having multiple layers ofsecurity such as request computer system 140 shown in FIG. 7 as havingrequest security proxy 105 and request security proxy 106, the outerlayer of security, e.g., request security proxy 105 performs the samefunctions as described for request security proxy 105 in requestcomputer system 100 of FIG. 4, except that the request security proxy105 receives the request message 10 from (and sends the response message40 or 70 to) the request security proxy 106 (an inner layer of security)instead of directly communicating with a request server, in the samemanner as is described for request security proxy 105 in FIG. 6.

The transmission of the request message 10 from request security proxy105 to the response computer system 340 is the same as that described inFIG. 4 (e.g., establishment of a second level encryption).

FIG. 8 also illustrates that the technique and configurations describedfor the response computer system 320 of FIG. 5 can be utilized with aresponse computer system 340 having a single server 302 and multiplelayers of security, e.g., response security gateway 305 and responsesecurity proxy 306; although embodiments of this disclosure includeresponse computer systems which have a single response server andmultiple layers of security, response computer systems which havemultiple response servers and a single layer of security, responsecomputer systems which have a single response server and a single layerof security, and response computer systems which have multiple responseservers and multiple layers of security.

The response server 302 may perform the message level decryption of arequest message 10 and message level encryption of a response message 40or 70 as described for response server 302 in the response computersystem 320 of FIG. 5. Request and response messages are received andsent from response server 302 via communication networking 308 and 309,response security proxy 306, and response security gateway 305.

When receiving request message 10 at or sending a response message 40 or70 from response server 302, the unsecure zone 307 of the responsecomputer system 340 in FIG. 8 may include one or more of communicationnetworking 308 and 309 along with one or more of response securitygateway 305 and response security proxy 306. The responding party mayhave granted personnel access to all the communication networking 308and 309 along with both response security gateway 305 and responsesecurity proxy 306, making all the communication networking 308 and 309along with both response security gateway 305 and response securityproxy 306, the unsecure zone 307. Alternatively, the responding partymay have granted personnel access to less than all the communicationnetworking 308 and 309 and/or less than both response security gateway305 and response security proxy 306, making a combination of thecommunication networking 308 and/or 309 and/or response security gateway305 and/or response security proxy 306, the unsecure zone 307.

In response computer system embodiments having multiple layers ofsecurity such as response computer system 340 shown in FIG. 8 as havingresponse security gateway 305 and response security proxy 306, the outerlayer of security, e.g., response security gateway 305 performs the samefunctions as described for response security gateway 305 in responsecomputer system 320 of FIG. 5, except that the response security gateway305 sends the request message 10 to (and receives the response message40 or 70 from) the response security proxy 306 (an inner layer ofsecurity) instead of directly communicating with a response server, inthe same manner as described for response security gateway 305 in FIG.7.

The response security proxy 306 may receive the request message 10having first level encryption (message level encryption) from theresponse security gateway 305 and analyze the request message 10. In theresponse security proxy 306, the request message 10 maintains themessage level encryption such that those with access to the responsesecurity proxy 306 cannot view or determine the content of the requestmessage 10 even when the response security proxy 306 analyzes therequest message 10. After analyzing the request message 10, the responsesecurity proxy 306 passes the request message 10 still having the firstlevel encryption (message level encryption) to response server 302.

The response server 302 of the response computer system 340 performs thesame message level decryption of the request message 10 and messagelevel encryption of a response message 40 or 70 as described forresponse server 302 in response computer system 320 in FIG. 5 and sendsthe response message 40 or 70 to the request computer system 120 via theresponse security gateway 305 and response security proxy 306 andcommunication networking 308 and 309.

Upon receipt of the response message 40 or 70 at the response securityproxy 306, the response security proxy 306 analyzes the response message40 or 70. In the response security proxy 306, the response message 40 or70 maintains the message level encryption such that those with access tothe response security proxy 306 cannot view or determine the content ofthe response message 40 or 70 even when the response security proxy 306analyzes the response message 40 or 70. After analyzing the responsemessage 40 or 70, the response security proxy 306 passes the responsemessage 40 or 70 still having the first level encryption (message levelencryption) to the response security gateway 305.

In the response security gateway 305, the response message 40 or 70maintains the message level encryption such that those with access tothe response security gateway 305 cannot view or determine the contentof the response message 40 or 70 even when the response security gateway305 analyzes the response message 40 or 70. After analyzing the responsemessage 40 or 70, the response security gateway 305 establishes thesecond level of encryption for transmission of the response message 40or 70 to the request computer system 140 in the same manner as describedfor FIG. 5.

Upon receipt of the response message 40 or 70 at the request securityproxy 105, the request security proxy 105 decrypts the second levelencryption and analyzes the response message 40 or 70 still having thefirst level encryption and, since the request security proxy 105 is theouter layer of security, the request security proxy 105 passes theresponse message 40 or 70 still having the first level encryption(message level encryption) to the request security proxy 106 viacommunication networking 108 for analysis at the request security proxy106. The request security proxy 106 may receive the response message 40or 70 having first level encryption (message level encryption) andanalyze the response message 40 or 70. In the request security proxy106, the response message 40 or 70 maintains the message levelencryption such that those with access to the request security proxy 106cannot view or determine the content of the response message 40 or 70even when the request security proxy 106 analyzes the response message40 or 70. After analyzing the response message 40 or 70, the requestsecurity proxy 106 passes the response message 40 or 70 still having thefirst level encryption (message level encryption) to the request server102, 103, or 104.

Nonlimiting examples of a requesting party and responding partydiscussed herein include financial institutions and application serviceproviders. Financial institutions may include but are not limited tobanks, building societies, credit unions, trust companies, mortgage loancompanies, insurance companies, pension funds, investment firms,underwriters, and brokerage firms. Application service providers includebut are not limited to payment processing providers and payment networkproviders. Examples of a “responding party” include application serviceproviders.

In embodiments, the requester public key and requester private key pairare rotated once per year. In embodiments, the responder public key andresponse private key are rotated one per year.

Code Example 1

The following Code Example 1 shows the Java interface definition thatcan be used to retrieve public and private keys from an enterprise keymanager, e.g., an HSM.

Key Management Interface public interface KeyManagement { // retrievethe requestor's public key by name public PublicKeyretrieveSendersPublicKey(String keyName); // retrieve the requestor'sprivate key by name public PrivateKey retrieveSendersPrivateKey(StringkeyName); // retrieve the responder's public key by name publicPublicKey retrieveReceiversPublicKey(String keyName); // retrieve theresponder's private key by name public PrivateKeyretrieveReceiversPrivateKey(String keyName); }

Retrieval of keys as disclosed herein may use a key name as a parameter.The key name can be any unique string that identifies the exchanged keysfor the retrieval. For example, the key name for the sender and receiverkey pairs for a particular bank might be “N3WLHB2BG63V2MA6GRB1LML0L0”.

Code Example 2

The following code block shows the Java interface definition that can beused to encrypt the request and response messages disclosed herein. ThisCode Example 2 may be used by the request server(s) to encrypt eachrequest message and by the response server(s) to encrypt each responsemessage. This Code Example 2 may also be used by the request server(s)(and optionally, the response server(s)) to generate, encrypt, and signthe request session key (and optionally, the response session key) thatis used by both the responding party and the requesting party.

Message Encryption Interface public interface MessageEncryption { //encode the bytes into a base 64 string public String encodeBytes(byte[ ]bytes); // sign the bytes using the private key public byte[ ]signBytes(PrivateKey privateKey, byte[ ] bytes); // generate a newsession key public SecretKey generateSharedKey( ); // encrypt thesession key using the public key public byte[ ]encryptSharedKey(PublicKey certificate, SecretKey sharedKey); // encryptthe stream using the session key public void encryptStream(SecretKeysharedKey, InputStream input, OutputStream output); }

Code Example 3

The following code block shows a similar Java interface definition thatcan be used to decrypt response and request messages. This Code Example3 may be used by the response server(s) to decrypt a request message andby the request server(s) to decrypt the response message. This CodeExample 3 may also be used to verify and decrypt a request session keyand response session key.

Message Decryption Interface public interface MessageDecryption { //decode the base 64 string into bytes public byte[ ] decodeString(Stringbase64String); // validate the signature for bytes using the public keypublic boolean bytesAreValid(PublicKey certificate, byte[ ] bytes, byte[] signature); // decrypt the session key using the private key publicSecretKey decryptSharedKey(PrivateKey privateKey, byte[ ] encryptedKey);// decrypt the stream using the session key public voiddecryptStream(SecretKey sharedKey, InputStream input, OutputStreamoutput); }

Code Example 4

Code Example 4 is for requester server(s) that perform encryption.

Encryption Code Example KeyManagement keyManager; MessageEncryptioncryptex; // generate and encrypt a new session key SecretKey sessionKey= cryptex.generateSharedKey( ); PublicKey receiverPublicKey =keyManager.retrieveReceiversPublicKey(“KeyName”); byte[ ]encryptedSessionKey = cryptex.encryptSharedKey(receiverPublicKey,sessionKey); String encodedSessionKey =cryptex.encodeBytes(encryptedSessionKey); // sign the encrypted sessionkey PrivateKey senderPrivateKey =keyManager.retrieveSendersPrivateKey(“KeyName ”); byte[ ] signature =cryptex.signBytes(senderPrivateKey, encryptedSessionKey); StringencodedSignature = cryptex.encodeBytes(signature); // encrypt the JSONrequest using the session key String request = “This is some JSONrequest...”; InputStream requestStream = newByteArrayInputStream(request.getBytes(“UTF-8”)); ByteArrayOutputStreamencryptedRequestStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream( );cryptex.encryptStream(sessionKey, requestStream,encryptedRequestStream);

Code Example 5

Code Example 5 is for responder server(s) that perform decryption.

Decryption Code Example KeyManagement keyManager; MessageDecryptioncryptex; // validate the session key signature PublicKey senderPublicKey= keyManager.retrieveSendersPublicKey(“KeyName”); byte[ ] signature =cryptex.decodeString(encodedSignature); assertcryptex.bytesAreValid(senderPublicKey, encryptedSessionKey, signature);// decrypt the session key PrivateKey receiverPrivateKey =keyManager.retrieveReceiversPrivateKey(“KeyName”); byte[ ]encryptedSessionKey = cryptex.decodeString(encodedSessionKey);sessionKey = cryptex.decryptSharedKey(receiverPrivateKey,encryptedSessionKey); // decrypt the request using the session keyByteArrayOutputStream decryptedRequestStream = newByteArrayOutputStream( ); cryptex.decryptStream(sessionKey,encryptedRequestStream, decryptedRequestStream);

The methods, computer systems, computer networks, apparatus, servers,processors, dedicated processors, and other computer componentsdisclosed herein provide a solution necessarily rooted in computertechnology to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm ofcomputer networks, e.g., problems related to the unsecure transmissionof messages between a requesting party's computer system and aresponding party's computer system. The disclosed solutions, whichinvolve message level encryption of messages transmitted via theembodiments disclosed herein, enable said embodiments to overcomeproblems such as unintended viewing of messages (i.e., the unintendedviewing of messages by those with authorized access to a computer systemor a component thereof), unauthorized viewing of messages,misappropriation or theft of information contained in the messages,collateral damage resulting from misappropriation or theft ofinformation, and identity theft or fraud resulting from misappropriationor theft. These solutions do not simply utilize the Internet and/orother information networks. Instead, the disclosed solutions solveproblems arising due to the structural nature of computer networksutilized by requesting parties and responding parties for thetransmission of messages. By utilizing the message level encryption, thedisclosed methods, computer systems, computer networks, apparatus,servers, processors, dedicated processors, and other computer hardwareutilize a specific technique necessarily rooted in computer technologyfor transmitting messages through one or more unsecure zones in one ormore computer systems.

While preferred embodiments of the invention have been shown anddescribed herein, modifications thereof can be made by one skilled inthe art without departing from the spirit and teachings of theinvention. The embodiments described herein are exemplary only, and arenot intended to be limiting. Many variations and modifications of theinvention disclosed herein are possible and are within the scope of theinvention. Where numerical ranges or limitations are expressly stated,such express ranges or limitations should be understood to includeiterative ranges or limitations of like magnitude falling within theexpressly stated ranges or limitations (e.g., from about 1 to about 10includes, 2, 3, 4, etc.; greater than 0.10 includes 0.11, 0.12, 0.13,etc.). Use of the term “optionally” with respect to any element of aclaim is intended to mean that the subject element is required, oralternatively, is not required. Both alternatives are intended to bewithin the scope of the claim. Use of broader terms such as comprises,includes, having, etc. should be understood to provide support fornarrower terms such as consisting of, consisting essentially of,comprised substantially of, etc.

The ordering of steps to perform the various functions described hereinis for illustration purposes and does not necessarily reflect the orderthat various steps must be performed. The steps may be rearranged indifferent orders in different embodiments to reflect the needs, desiresand preferences of the entity implementing the systems. Furthermore,many steps may be performed simultaneously with other steps in someembodiments.

Also, techniques, systems, subsystems and methods described andillustrated in the various embodiments as discrete or separate may becombined or integrated with other systems, modules, applications,instructions, techniques, or methods without departing from the scope ofthe present disclosure. Other items shown or discussed as directlycoupled or communicating with each other may be coupled through someinterface or device, such that the items may no longer be considereddirectly coupled to each other but may still be indirectly coupled andin communication, whether electrically, mechanically, or otherwise withone another. Other examples of changes, substitutions, and alterationsare ascertainable by one skilled in the art and could be made withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope disclosed herein.

Accordingly, the scope of protection is not limited by the descriptionset out above but is only limited by the claims which follow, that scopeincluding all equivalents of the subject matter of the claims. Each andevery claim is incorporated into the specification as an embodiment ofthe present invention. Thus, the claims are a further description andare an addition to the preferred embodiments of the present invention.The discussion of a reference is not an admission that it is prior artto the present invention, especially any reference that may have apublication date after the priority date of this application. Thedisclosures of all patents, patent applications, and publications citedherein are hereby incorporated by reference, to the extent that theyprovide exemplary, procedural or other details supplementary to thoseset forth herein.

It is claimed:
 1. A method for message level encryption executed by oneor more dedicated processors of a computer system of a requesting partyfor encrypted transmission of messages through an unsecure zone withinthe computer system of the requesting party, through an unsecure zonewithin a computer system of a responding party, or through both, themethod comprising: encrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors,a request message with a request message-level encryption; encrypting,by the one or more dedicated processors, the request message with arequest second level encryption; and sending, by the one or morededicated processors, the request message to a responding party via theunsecure zone within the computer system of the requesting party, viathe unsecure zone within the computer system of the responding party, orvia both.
 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: generating, bythe one or more dedicated processors, a request session key uniquelycreated for the request message; and encrypting, by the one or morededicated processors, the request session key to produce an encryptedrequest session key; for the request message level encryption, therequest message comprising a request header and a request body, therequest header comprising the encrypted request session key and arequest signature for the encrypted request session key, a requesterprivate key being used to generate the request signature, the requestsession key being encrypted using a responder public key, and therequest body being encrypted using the request session key.
 3. Themethod of claim 2, the request second level encryption being TLSencryption within HTTPS.
 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:receiving, by the one or more dedicated processors, a response messagehaving a response message level encryption and a response second levelencryption from the responding party via passage of the response messagethrough the unsecure zone within the computer system of the requestingparty, via passage of the response message through the unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the responding party, or via both.
 5. Themethod of claim 4, for the response message level encryption, theresponse message comprising a response header and a response body, theresponse header comprising an encrypted response session key and aresponse signature for the encrypted response session key, a responderprivate key being used to generate the response signature, the responsebody being encrypted using a response session key, and the responsesession key being encrypted using a requester public key.
 6. The methodof claim 5, further comprising; decrypting, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, the response second level encryption; and decrypting, by theone or more dedicated processors, the response message level encryptionusing the requester private key, the response session key, or both. 7.The method of claim 4, for the response message level encryption, theresponse message comprising a response body, the response body beingencrypted using the request session key.
 8. The method of claim 7,further comprising; decrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors,the response second level encryption; and decrypting, by the one or morededicated processors, the response message level encryption using therequest session key.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the unsecure zoneof the computer system of the requesting party comprises a requestsecurity proxy, a request communication networking, or both; wherein theunsecure zone of the computer system of the responding party comprises aresponse security gateway, a response communication networking, or both;or both.
 10. The method of claim 1, further comprising: not storing, bythe one or more dedicated processors, the request session key on thecomputer system of the requesting party.
 11. The method of claim 1, therequest session key being destroyed by the requesting party and theresponding party.
 12. The method of claim 1, further comprising:storing, by the one or more dedicated processors, a requester publickey, a requester private key, and a responder public key in an HSMsystem of the requesting party.
 13. A method for message levelencryption executed by one or more dedicated processors of a computersystem of a responding party for encrypted transmission of messagesthrough an unsecure zone within the computer system of the respondingparty, through an unsecure zone within a computer system of a requestingparty, or through both, the method comprising: encrypting, by the one ormore dedicated processors, the response message with a responsemessage-level encryption; encrypting, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, the response message with a response second levelencryption; and sending, by the one or more dedicated processors, theresponse message to the requesting party via the unsecure zone withinthe computer system of the requesting party, via the unsecure zonewithin the computer system of the responding party, or via both.
 14. Themethod of claim 13, the method further comprising: receiving, by the oneor more dedicated processors, a request session key from the requestingparty; for the response message level encryption, the response messagecomprising a response body, the response body being encrypted using therequest session key.
 15. The method of claim 14, the response secondlevel encryption being TLS encryption within HTTPS.
 16. The method ofclaim 13, further comprising: generating, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a response session key uniquely created for the responsemessage; and encrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, theresponse session key to produce an encrypted response session key; forthe response message level encryption, the response message comprising aresponse header and a response body, the response header comprising theencrypted response session key and a response signature for theencrypted response session key, a responder private key being used togenerate the response signature, the response session key beingencrypted using a requester public key, and the response body beingencrypted using the response session key.
 17. The method of claim 16,the response second level encryption being TLS encryption within HTTPS.18. The method of claim 13, further comprising: receiving, by the one ormore dedicated processors, a request message having a request messagelevel encryption and a request second level encryption from therequesting party via passage of the request message through the unsecurezone within the computer system of the requesting party, via passage ofthe response message through the unsecure zone within the computersystem of the responding party, or via both.
 19. The method of claim 18,for the request message level encryption, the request message comprisinga request header and a request body, the request header comprising anencrypted request session key and a request signature for the encryptedrequest session key, a requester private key being used to generate therequest signature, a request session key being encrypted using aresponder public key to produce the encrypted request session key, andthe request body being encrypted using the request session key.
 20. Themethod of claim 19, further comprising; decrypting, by the one or morededicated processors, the request second level encryption; anddecrypting, by the one or more dedicated processors, the request messagelevel encryption using the responder private key, the request sessionkey, or both.
 21. The method of claim 13, wherein the unsecure zone ofthe computer system of the requesting party comprises a request securityproxy, a communication networking, or both; wherein the unsecure zone ofthe computer system of the responding party comprises a request securitygateway, a communication networking, or both; or both.
 22. The method ofclaim 13, further comprising: storing, by the one or more dedicatedprocessors, a responder public key, a responder private key, and arequester public key in an HSM system of the responding party.